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Abstract 
In this paper, I argue how employment protection legislation (EPL) influences relational 
employment contracts. Firing costs caused by EPL are categorized into two kinds: 
procedural inconveniences (negotiation costs) and severance pay. I focus on the 
minimum value of the discount factor that sustains mutual cooperation under trigger 
strategies, and show that a hike in firing costs first enhances and then dampens 
cooperation. Additionally, a hike in severance pay leads to moral hazard for workers. 
EPL processes, especially procedural inconveniences such as negotiations with unions, 
can enhance cooperative employment relationships as long as they are not large. 
Moderate, not overly strict, EPL is supportive of cooperative employment relationships. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Numerous studies have focused on the effects of employment protection 
legislation (EPL) on the economy, especially from macroeconomic perspectives. 
However, they have provided ambiguous results. Bertola, Boeri, and Cazes (2000) cite 
the complexity of social institutions as the main reason for the ambiguity. Difficulties 
posed by social institutions include industrial relationships with central or local wage 
bargaining, safety nets such as unemployment insurance, the structure of internal and 
external labor markets, and so on. These factors differ from country to country and are 
influenced by different historical and regional backgrounds. Further supporting this 
view, recent studies by Aghion, Algan, Cahuc, and Shleifer (2010), Aghion, Algan, and 
Cahuc (2011), and Blanchard and Philippon (2006) point out that state regulation of 
labor markets is negatively correlated with the quality of industrial relationships. In 
countries with strict labor regulations such as France and the southern European 
countries, the quality of industrial relationships is poor. In contrast, in the Nordic 
countries where moderate regulations exist, cooperative and trusting industrial 
relationships have been established. These studies imply that microeconomic 
perspectives on industrial relationships are crucial to evaluate the effects of EPL.  
 Since conflictual employment relationships are likely to lead to poor 
performance, it is vital to identify how good employment relationships are associated 
with strict and moderate EPL. Strict EPL seems to be unnecessary if good relationships 
have been established; labor market regulations can be substituted for trusting 
relationships. However, this does not mean that EPL is not needed at all. EPL may 
support good and trusting relationships. This study aims to consider how EPL influences 
a cooperative employment relationship.  
 A good relationship makes it possible to enhance cooperation between a firm 
and a worker through an implicit relational contract mechanism. A relational contract 
mechanism is especially crucial when behaviors of firms and workers are not verifiable. 
When verifiable observations are less accurate at measuring contributions of workers, as 
Baker (1992) (2002) reveals, it is not beneficial to evaluate workers’ contributions with 
them. As the well-known multitask principal-agent model of Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1991) shows, if firms are tempted to base the remuneration of workers on verifiable but 
inappropriate observations, it does not necessarily bring firms the most benefits. Given 
the reality of multitasking, as Brown (1990) points out, firms are likely to adopt implicit 
relational contract mechanisms rather than high-powered incentive schemes based only 
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on verifiable observations. The appropriate motivation of workers can be developed 
with a relational contract mechanism. 
 Long-term employment relationships that are formed through a relational 
contract can induce workers to pay more attention to unverifiable but essential work. 
EPL can help to support long-term employment relationships; thus, it may enhance good 
employment relationships. In contrast, the efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1984), a leading theory, holds that the threat of dismissal is a driving force in worker 
incentives. EPL may provide a negative impact because shirking workers are not likely 
to be fired or punished. Therefore, it is important to analyze both the positive and 
negative effects within the relational contract framework.  
 In this paper, I consider an employment relationship with a firm and a worker. 
A firm offers a remuneration package consisting of an explicit-contract basic wage and 
an implicit-contract bonus. Since the worker’s performance is not observed by a third 
party, the firm cannot make an explicit-contract wage conditional on the worker’s 
performance. The basic wage must be paid regardless of the worker’s performance; thus, 
the firm does not offer incentives to the worker. An implicit-contract bonus can be a 
driving force to encourage the worker. However, the implicit bonus payment is under 
the control of the firm, and thus the firm may not pay the bonus even if the worker has 
shown good performance. This is a typical hold-up problem whereby the firm does not 
pay any positive bonus and therefore the worker makes no effort if they play the 
one-shot game. 
 To enforce the implicit bonus and encourage the worker to show good 
performance, a repeated employment relationship must be formed. It is well established 
through the folk theorem that the firm and the worker will engage in cooperative 
behaviors when they emphasize more on mutual future benefits; that is, their discount 
factors are sufficiently high.1 In this paper, to examine how EPL enhances cooperation, 
I analyze the effect of EPL on the minimum value of discount factors that sustain 
mutual cooperation under trigger strategies. Although trigger strategies are restrictive, 
they make it possible to derive the minimum value of discount factors for mutual 
cooperation. The approach is similar to Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994), who 
consider the relationship between subjective but correct performance measures and 
                                                  
1 Bull (1987) and Macleod and Malcomson (1989), seminal studies on the relational contract theory, 
analyzed what type of contracts can implement cooperation continuously. Levin (2003) considered 
an optimal relational contract in the constrained situation in which players confront asymmetric and 
unverifiable information. 
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objective but distortionary ones under trigger strategies. They show a complementary 
relationship between subjective and objective performance measures to implement 
cooperative behaviors.  
 Firing costs that firms bear are categorized into two kinds: one is a monetary 
transfer such as severance pay and the other is a procedural inconvenience such as 
providing advance notices or negotiations with unions. Although both increase the firing 
cost for firms, monetary transfer is limited to earnings for workers, but procedural 
inconvenience results in wasteful loss. Monetary transfer seems to be better, but it also 
benefits shirking workers and may dampen worker incentives. This difference is crucial 
in the analysis of the effects of EFL.  
The main conclusion of this study is that as the firing cost increases, the 
minimum discount factor that sustains mutual cooperation first decreases, and then 
increases. In other words, initially EPL enhances industrial relationships and supports 
cooperative employment relationships, but as it is strict, it eventually dampens 
relationships. EPL plays a positive role in deterring the firm from exploiting output 
without paying a bonus. However, EPL can also have a negative effect on worker 
incentive. When EPL is moderately strict, the former positive effect on industrial 
relationships overrides the latter negative one. In contrast, in the case of strict EPL, the 
positive effect is dominated by the negative one. Moreover, it will be shown that, as the 
fraction of monetary transfer in the firing cost increases, a cooperative employment 
relationship is unlikely to be sustained. Therefore, we conclude that moderate EPL 
enhances mutual cooperation, and negotiation with unions is more crucial than 
severance pay. 
This paper contributes to the literature on the effect of EPL on incentives. As 
the efficiency wage model suggests, EPL seems to have a disincentive effect. However, 
it has also been shown that EPL can provide a positive effect on incentives by several 
studies such as Fella (2000), Galdon-Sanchez and Guell (2003), Suedekum and 
Ruehmann (2003), Belot, Boone, and van Ours (2007), and Demougin and Helm (2011). 
Although the theoretical frameworks of these studies differ, they are limited to one-shot 
relationships in which EPL plays a significant role as a kind of commitment device. In 
contrast, I focus on the effects of EPL on the sustainability of cooperative employment 
relationships through a relational contract, and show that cooperative relationships can 
be built with appropriate EPL.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of an 
infinitely repeated game model in which a firm and a worker play trigger strategies. 
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There are two phases: cooperative and punishment. First, I consider the punishment 
phase in section 3. Next, in sections 4 and 5, I show equilibrium remuneration and the 
effects of EPL on cooperation after and before establishing a relationship, respectively. 
Finally, section 6 presents the conclusions. 
 
 
2. Model 
 
1. Model  
 I consider an employment relationship between a firm and a worker. A firm 
requires a worker to make an effort to produce a high output. If a worker bears the effort 
cost of ȝ, he produces the output of y = 1 over the effort cost ȝ. If he shirks his work, he 
produces nothing, y = 0. I assume that the worker’s contribution is observable to the 
firm, but is too complex and subtle to be verified by a third party, and so cannot be the 
basis of an enforceable contract. The output is subjectively assessed inside the 
employment relationship.  
 Remuneration consists of a basic wage w and an implicit-contract bonus b. A 
firm offers a worker a remuneration package, ( , )p w b{ . The firm can decide on a 
basic wage and a bonus freely as long as it is non-negative. The firm must pay the basic 
wage w regardless of the worker’s performance whenever he is employed. The basic 
wage is always enforced by a third party, such as a court. On the other hand, the third 
party cannot require that any implicit-contract bonus be fulfilled. The bonus can be paid 
after the worker’s performance is revealed. Profit of the firm in a period is given by 
y w bS     if the firm pays the bonus. 
 The employment relationship can be infinitely repeated, and a worker and a 
firm play trigger strategies. Therefore, the worker and the firm begin to cooperate and 
then continue cooperating unless either of them defects. If either of them deviates from 
cooperation, they refuse to cooperate forever after.2  
 
2. Timing of behaviors 
 Here, the timing of events within each period is considered. Formally, each 
period t is divided into four subperiods; t0 in which the firm offers a remuneration 
                                                  
2 The trigger strategies have the virtue of being simple to analyze. As a result, I do not consider an 
optimal punishment scheme and renegotiation, which are beyond my focus in this paper.  
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package ( , )t t tp w b  to the worker; t1 in which the worker decides on quitting (qt = 0) 
or not (qt = 1); t2 in which the worker makes a decision on his output, yt = 0 or 1, if he 
remains in the firm; and t3 in which the firm pays the basic wage and gives, or does not 
give, the bonus. Then, the next period comes, and the same behaviors are repeated if the 
employment relationship continues. The timing of the behaviors is summarized in figure 
1.  
 The firm makes a decision on a bonus payment after observing the worker’s 
behavior. The employment relationship can be dissolved in subperiod t1 of a period t; a 
worker can quit after observing a remuneration package ( , )t t tp w b  and before 
generating output in the period. The firm commits a basic wage in subperiod t0, then 
pays it in subperiod t3. This indicates that the firm has to pay the basic wage after the 
production process has been completed in subperiod t2, but does not have to pay before 
it has been completed. In other words, if the worker quits the firm in subperiod t1, the 
worker cannot get the basic wage wt but the gets outside wage w . 
 
3. Firing cost 
 The firm bears firing cost f caused by EPL when an employment relationship is 
broken off. The firing cost consists of an administrative cost, which is a socially 
wasteful transaction cost such as procedural inconveniences, and a monetary transfer 
such as severance pay. On the discussion of EPL, it seems to be natural that firms bear a 
firing cost whenever they fire workers, but firms do not bear this cost when workers 
leave their jobs voluntarily. However, we must realize that firms are willing to pretend 
not to fire workers and avoid a firing cost if workers quit voluntarily. In fact, firms can 
induce workers to leave by lowering their remuneration. This seems to be the voluntary 
turnover of workers, but in essence they are fired. If this was not accepted as firing but 
instead as voluntary turnover, EPL would not function. It would just be a veil. In this 
paper, to consider the effect of EPL, it is assumed that a firm has to bear the firing cost 
regardless of the reasons of why a worker quits his firm, involuntarily or voluntarily. 
The firm must incur the firing cost whenever the employment relationship is dissolved.  
 Once an employment relationship has been established, the firm has to bear the 
firing cost upon dissolving the employment relationship. In contrast, in the beginning of 
period 1, the employment relationship has not been established yet; thus, the firm does 
not incur the firing cost when the worker rejects the firm’s offer. As I show later, this 
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difference is crucial.  
 When the employment relationship is broken off, the firm bears firing cost f, 
which consists of a monetary transfer kf and administrative cost (1-k)f, where k 
( 0 1kd d ) is a parameter representing the fraction of the monetary transfer in the firing 
cost. The firing cost and the fraction of the monetary transfer are exogenously given as a 
social rule in the economy.3  
 In the incumbent period in which the employment relationship is broken off, 
payoffs of the firm and the worker are íf and kf w , respectively.4 Since the worker 
rejects the offer before producing output, the worker works outside the firm and gets the 
outside wage w  in addition to the severance pay kf. Then, in the next period or later, 
payoffs of the firm and the worker are 0 and w , respectively.  
 
4. Trigger strategies 
 Let at denote an outcome of these decisions in period t: at = {pt, qt, yt, bt}. The 
histories that are common knowledge to the firm and the worker are given by, 
 
 0 1 2 1( ) ( , , ... , )th t a a a  , where 0(1 )h  I , 
 1 0( ) ( ) { }th t h t p  , 
 2 1( ) ( ) { }th t h t q  , 
 3 2( ) ( ) { }th t h t y  . 
   
The firm and the worker can observe all of their behaviors; they do not face any 
problems caused by asymmetric information. I focus on the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium of this model. In the repeated game with perfect information, there are two 
phases under trigger strategies: cooperative and punishment. In the cooperative phase, 
the worker produces high output and the firm pays the bonus. I denote the outcome of a 
period t that belongs to the cooperative phase as, 
 
                                                  
3 In the real world, the fraction of the monetary transfer and administrative cost in the firing cost 
tend to be dependent on the history and quality of employment relationships. Fired workers may 
receive generous severance pay at a low administrative cost under good employment relationships. 
In contrast, it may take a long time to reach an agreement between firms and fired workers under 
poor relationships. In this case, the administrative cost is likely to be large. Thus, this model can be 
applied to various situations by appropriate adjustment of the parameters.  
4 In period 1, the current payoffs of the firm and the worker are 0 and w , respectively, when the 
worker rejects the firm’s offer because the employment relationship has not been established. 
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* * * *
1 1 1 1{( , ) , 1, 1, } 1,
* {( *, *) , 1, 1, *} 2,3,...t
a w b b if t
a
a w b b if t
­ {   ® {  ¯
 
 
 Formally, the trigger strategy of the firm is as follows: 
 
  
* *
1 1
0 0 *
1
( , ) , 1,
( ( )) ( *, *) , 2 ( ) ( , *, ..., *),
( , 0) , ;
t
d
w b if t
p h t w b if t and h t a a a
w otherwise
­  
° t  ®
°¯
 
  
* 3 * *
1 1 1
3 3 *
1
, (1 ) {( , ) , 1, 1},
( ( )) *, 2 ( ) ( , *, ..., *, {( *, *) , 1, 1}),
0, .
t
b if h w b
b h t b if t and h t a a a w b
otherwise
­  
° t  ®
°¯
 
 
The trigger strategy of the firm indicates that in period 1, the firm offers the 
remuneration package (w1*, b1*). Then, if the worker accepts the firm’s offer and the 
output of the worker is y = 1, the firm pays the bonus b1*. Otherwise, the firm does not. 
In period t (= 2, 3,…), if the outcome of all t í 1 preceding periods has been in the 
cooperative phase, the firm offers the remuneration package (w*, b*) and pays the 
bonus. Otherwise, the firm offers a different remuneration package ( , 0)t dp w . 
 Similarly, the trigger strategy of the worker is defined as follows: 
 
  
1 * *
1 1 1
1
1 *
1
1, (1 ) {( , )} ,
2,1,
( ( ))
[1] ( ) ( , *, ..., *, {( *, *)}) [2] (1 ) ,
0, ;
t
t
if h w b or w w
if t and
q h t
h t a a a w b or w kf w
otherwise
­  t
° t° ®  t G °
°¯
 
  
2 * *
1 1
2 2 *
1
1, (1 ) {( , ) , 1},
( ( )) 1, 2 ( ) ( , *, ..., *, {( *, *) , 1}),
0, .
t
if h w b
y h t if t and h t a a a w b
otherwise
­  
° t  ®
°¯
 
 
The trigger strategy of the worker indicates that in period 1, the worker accepts the 
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firm’s offer and generates high output if the remuneration package (w1*, b1*) is offered. 
In period t (= 2, 3,…), if the outcome of all t í 1 preceding periods has been in the 
cooperative phase, the worker remains in the firm and makes an effort to generate 
output. Otherwise, the worker will shirk his work duties or quit the firm.  
 Note that in the punishment phase the worker is willing to remain in the firm 
when the basic wage offered is equivalent to or more than his alternative payoff. The 
alternative payoff depends on whether the employment relationship has been established. 
Once the relationship has been established, the worker is willing to remain in the firm in 
the punishment phase if the basic wage offer is equivalent to or more than (1 )w kf G , 
which is the average payoff per period that the worker receives by quitting. When the 
relationship has not been established in period 1, the worker will accept the firm’s offer 
if a basic wage offer is equivalent to or more than the outside wage w . As I show in the 
next section, when the firing cost is huge, the firm is willing to maintain the 
employment relationship even if the worker will not produce anything. 
  
 
3. Punishment phase 
  
 The behaviors of the firm and the worker in period 1 depend largely on their 
expected future behaviors; thus, I proceed to consider period 2 or later. First, I have to 
deliberate the punishment phase, where the worker does not produce anything and the 
firm does not pay any bonus.  
 The punishment phase will continue forever once either the firm or the worker 
deviates from the cooperative phase.5 In the punishment phase, the firm can choose two 
states, “firing” and “dead wood,” through the basic wage offer. “Firing” means 
dissolving the employment relationship by offering a basic wage lower than the 
worker’s alternative payoff. In contrast, “dead wood” indicates continuing the 
relationship by offering a basic wage sufficient enough to maintain the relationship. The 
firm realizes that the worker generates no output; he is nothing but “dead wood.” 
However, the firm will maintain the employment relationship in the punishment phase 
when the firing cost f is very large. To make the worker remain in the firm, a basic wage 
plays a significant role. It can deter the worker from quitting the firm, but a bonus offer 
                                                  
5 Under the trigger strategies, players never return to the cooperative phase. In section 6, I mention a 
case in which they can return to the cooperative phase. 
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cannot because it is not credible for the worker in the punishment phase. 
The firm is willing to continue employing the worker as dead wood in the 
punishment phase when it holds that 
0
i
d
i
f w
f
 
t G¦ , where the discount factor denoted as 
( 1)G d  is common for the worker and the firm. On the other hand, the worker will 
remain in the firm when it holds that 
0 0
i i
d
i i
kf w w
f f
  
 G d G¦ ¦ . If the two inequalities hold 
simultaneously, 
 
 1( , ) 1 (1 )
wk f
k f
G  G {   ,                                  …(1) 
 
the employment relationship continues even in the punishment phase. The firm will 
offer the minimum value of the basic wage if it is willing to maintain the employment 
relationship: (1 )dw w kf  G . Otherwise, the firm will offer a basic wage strictly less 
than (1 )w kf G , for example, 0dw  ; thus, the worker quits and the employment 
relationship is broken off. The behaviors in the punishment phase, therefore, depend on 
the strictness of EPL.  
 
Lemma 1 
  The trigger strategies of the firm and the worker are the best responses to their 
partners’ strategies toward each other in the punishment phase. The outcome of a period 
t in the punishment phase is [1] in the case of 1( , )k fG t G , 
{ , , , } {(0, 0) , 0, 0, 0}t t t t ta p q y b   and [2] in the case of 1( , )k fG  G , 
{( (1 ) , 0) , 1, 0, 0}ta w kf  G . 
 
The proof is given in the Appendix. Condition (1) shows that, as the firing cost 
increases, the employment relationship is likely to continue in the punishment phase. 
Moreover, as the fraction of the monetary transfer in the firing cost increases, firing 
tends to be conducted. When the fraction of the monetary transfer is high, the firm has 
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to pay a high basic wage to maintain the relationship. Thus, the firm is likely to induce 
the worker to quit. 
 
 
4. After establishing a relationship 
 
1. Incentive conditions of a worker 
 Next, I consider incentive compatibilities of a firm and a worker to keep the 
cooperative phase in period 2 or later. Then, we will return to period 1.  
 First, I analyze the incentive compatibilities of a worker in the cooperative 
phase. A firm has to offer an equilibrium remuneration package (w*, b*) that satisfies 
the incentive compatibilities of a worker to maintain the cooperative phase. The 
incentive compatibilities of a worker in subperiod t1 and t2 are given by 
 
 WIC-q: 
0 0
( * * )i i
i i
w b kf w
f f
  
G  P t  G¦ ¦ ,                    ͐(2) 
 
 WIC-y: 
0 0
( * * ) *i i
i i
w b w kf w
f f
  
§ ·G  P t G  G¨ ¸© ¹¦ ¦ .             ͐(3) 
 
The left-hand sides of WIC-q and WIC-y indicate the present value of the worker’s total 
payoffs in period t in the cooperative phase. The right-hand side of WIC-q mentions the 
present value of the worker’s total payoffs when the worker rejects the remuneration 
package and quits the firm in subperiod t1. The right-hand side of WIC-y indicates the 
present value of the worker’s total payoff when the worker engages in shirking behavior. 
A shirking worker receives the current basic wage w* because the worker has already 
been employed in period t. However, the bonus is not paid in subperiod t3.  
 As mentioned, in the punishment phase, a firm can choose between two states, 
firing or dead wood. However, the present value of the worker’s total payoff is not 
affected by the firm’s decision in the punishment phase because the firm is willing to 
offer the minimum basic wage to keep the worker as dead wood. 
 The two constraints of WIC-q and WIC-y must be satisfied to prevent the 
worker from deviation. Since the firm is willing to minimize the remuneration cost, the 
basic wage w* should be lower than (1 )w kf G :  
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* (1 )w w kfd  G .                                         …(4) 
 
In this case, WIC-y is slack as long as WIC-q holds. Thus, WIC-q is binding at the 
equilibrium:  
 
 * * (1 )w b w kf  P  G .                                  …(5) 
 
To implement and keep the cooperative phase, the firm is willing to offer the 
remuneration package ( *, *)w b  satisfying (4) and (5).  
  
2. Incentive conditions of a firm  
 Next, I consider the incentive compatibilities of the firm to pay the implicit 
bonus. The firm makes a decision on the bonus after observing the behavior of the 
worker. Even if the worker produces positive output, the firm can breach the implicit 
promise on the bonus. It is necessary to check whether the firm is willing to pay the 
bonus b* to keep the cooperative phase.  
 The firm makes a decision on a remuneration package in subperiod t0 and the 
bonus payment in subperiod t3. The firm’s incentive compatibilities in period t (= 2, 
3,…) are given, respectively, as follows:  
  
 FIC-p: 
0
(1 * *) min ,
1
i
i
ww b f kf
f
 
­ ½G   t  ® ¾ G¯ ¿¦ ,                …(6) 
 
 FIC-b㸸
0
(1 * *) 1 * min ,
1
i
i
ww b w f kf
f
 
­ ½G   t  G ® ¾G¯ ¿¦ .          ͐(7) 
 
The left-hand side of FIC-p and FIC-b indicates the present value of the firm’s total 
payoffs in the cooperative phase. The right-hand side of FIC-p indicates the firm’s 
payoff when the firm deviates from the equilibrium remuneration package. The outcome 
depends on the strictness of EPL. In the case of firing, the firm bears the firing cost f. 
On the other hand, in the case of dead wood, the firm keeps on paying the basic wage in 
a period equivalent to (1 )w kf G ; thus, the present value of the total wage cost is 
1
wkf   G .  
 The right-hand side of FIC-b is the payoff of the firm when the firm does not 
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pay the bonus b*. The firm can swindle the output, but has to pay the basic wage w*. 
Then, the punishment phase starts from the next period. 
 
Lemma 2 
  FIC-p holds as long as FIC-b does.  
 
The Proof is easy and given in the Appendix. FIC-p is slack, and thus I focus only on 
FIC-b.  
 
3. Equilibrium remuneration package 
 It is well established by the folk theorem that cooperation between a firm and a 
worker can be implemented and continued when the discount factor is sufficiently high. 
By considering the trigger strategies, I can derive the minimum value of the discount 
factor, G , to sustain the cooperative phase. Higher w* reduces the right-hand side of 
FIC-b and makes FIC-b less tight. As the right-hand side of FIC-b is smaller, the 
discount factor for cooperation dwindles. Therefore, the minimum discount factor is 
derived under the remuneration package by * (1 )w w kf  G  and *b  P . 
 
Lemma 3 
  The minimum discount factor for cooperation is given under the remuneration 
package: * (1 )w w kf  G  and *b  P . 
 
 The implicit bonus is the driving force for the worker’s incentive, but is 
independent of the firing cost. The firing cost influences the basic wage only. 
Substituting the remuneration package into FIC-b, the minimum discount factor G  is 
derived. In the case of firing, 1( , )k fG t G , FIC-b turns into a quadratic condition: 
^ `2( , ) (1 ) 1 (1 ) 0g k f k f w k f{ G   G    P d . Then, we denote a smaller solution of 
( , ) 0g k f   as 2 ( , )k fG . Clearly, the quadratic condition holds under 2 ( , )k fG t G ; 
thus, the minimum discount factor for cooperation is given by 2 ( , )k fG  G . Similarly, 
in the case of dead wood, 1( , )k fG  G , FIC-b becomes a simple condition: G t P . 
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Thus, the minimum discount factor is given by G  P . The results are summarized as 
follows: 
 
Proposition 1 
[1] In the case of firing, which occurs under 0
(1 )(1 )
wf
k
 d  P , 
  
 
^ `2
2
1 (1 ) 1 (1 ) 4(1 )
( , )
2(1 )
w k f w k f k f
k f
k f
         P
G  G {
 . 
 
[2] In the case of dead wood, which occurs under 
(1 )(1 )
wf
k
!  P , 
G  P . 
[3] In the case of 1k   or 0f  , it holds that 
1 w
PG   . 
 
The Proof is given in the Appendix. The minimum discount factor for cooperation is 
drawn as the red bold curve shown in figure 2. The case of 1k   or 0f   gives a 
corner solution. Therefore, attention is given to the interior solution under 0 1kd   
and 0f !  throughout this paper. 
 
4. Effects of EPL 
The effect of the firing cost on the minimum discount factor is given as 
follows: 
 
Proposition 2 
[1] In the case of firing, a hike in the firing cost decreases the minimum discount factor 
for cooperation. An increase in the fraction k of the monetary transfer in the firing cost 
raises the minimum discount factor. 
[2] In the case of dead wood, a hike in the firing cost or fraction k of the monetary 
transfer does not affect the minimum discount factor for cooperation. 
 
The Proof is shown in the Appendix. As figure 2 indicates, in the case of firing, the 
minimum discount factor dwindles as the firing cost increases. This means that the 
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firing cost deters the firm and the worker from deviating. In other words, the firing cost 
plays a significant role in enforcing the implicit bonus b* and enhancing cooperation. 
When the firing cost exceeds the critical level: 
(1 )(1 )
wf
k
  P , the firm is willing to 
maintain the employment relationship even in the punishment phase. In the case of dead 
wood, a hike in the firing cost does not affect the minimum discount factor for 
cooperation.  
 A hike in the firing cost f means an increase in the administrative and 
negotiation costs of firing. The ex post rent of the employment relationship is increased 
by a hike in the firing cost. Thus, it gives the firm and the worker more incentives to 
maintain the cooperative relationship. This generates the positive effect and motivation 
to decrease the minimum discount factor for cooperation. On the other hand, an increase 
in fraction k of the monetary transfer decreases the administrative cost, which decreases 
the ex post rent of the employment relationship. Thus, it gives a negative effect on their 
cooperation.  
 When the firing cost is large, the firm will continue employing the worker as 
dead wood in the punishment phase; thus, the firm does not bear the large firing cost 
directly. The firing cost does not influence all of the ex post rent of the employment 
relationship if it exceeds the critical point. While a hike in the firing cost raises the 
remuneration that the worker can receive, in the case of dead wood, it is just an issue of 
the distribution of the rent between the firm and the worker. As lemma 3 indicates, the 
bonus is independent of the firing cost and monetary transfer. Once the employment 
relationship has been established, the worker can always receive the benefit of the 
monetary transfer through the basic wage specified by lemma 3. Thus, the firing cost 
and monetary transfer are not directly associated with behaviors of the firm and the 
worker when the punishment phase is the case of dead wood.  
 As mentioned above, a huge firing cost does not influence the minimum value 
of the discount factor for cooperation once the employment relationship has been 
established. However, a huge firing cost will have an influence if the relationship has 
not been established. This is the next issue to consider. 
  
 
5. Before establishing a relationship 
 
1. Incentive conditions in period 1  
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 I have considered the periods (t = 2, 3,…) after the employment relationship 
has been established, where the firm bears the firing cost f and the worker receives the 
monetary transfer kf whenever the worker quits (or is fired by) the firm. In contrast, the 
firm does not have to bear the firing cost in period 1 when the worker rejects the firm’s 
offer because the employment relationship has yet to be established. The difference is 
crucial between the before and after period of establishing the relationship. Now, we 
return to period 1. 
The minimum value of the discount factor G , which sustains mutual 
cooperation after establishing the relationship in period 2 or later, has been shown in 
proposition 1. It is needed to consider whether the discount factor also satisfies the 
incentive compatibilities of the worker and the firm before establishing the relationship. 
Unless it did, the employment relationship would not be established or the cooperative 
phase would not begin in period 1 under the discount factor G ; thus, a discount factor 
higher than G  would be needed to implement cooperation from period 1. 
The incentive compatibilities of the worker in subperiod 11 and 12 are given, 
respectively, as follows: 
 
 WIC-1-q: * *1 1 ( * * )1 1
ww b w bG P   P tG G ,              ͐(8) 
 
 WIC-1-y: * * *1 1 1( * * )1 1
ww b w b w kfG § · P   P t  G ¨ ¸ G  G© ¹
.    ͐(9) 
 
When the worker rejects the firm’s offer in period 1, the worker receives only the 
outside wage w , thereby, as shown on the right-hand side of WIC-1-q, the present 
value of the total payoff is 
1
w
G . In contrast, the right-hand side of WIC-1-y (9) is 
similar, except w1* and w*, to that of WIC-y (3) because the production process has 
finished and the employment relationship has been established.  
 If *1w w kfd  G , WIC-1-y is slack as long as WIC-1-q holds. Since the basic 
wage w1* in period 1 is non-negative, WIC-1-y is slack in the case of w kft G . In this 
case, using lemma 3, WIC-1-q requires * *1 1w b w kf t P   G . Since the firm is willing 
to minimize the remuneration, the optimal remuneration package in period 1 is given by 
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 *1 [0 , ]w w kf G  and * *1 1w b w kf  P   G . 
 
Otherwise, in the case of w kf G , WIC-1-y is more crucial than WIC-1-q because 
WIC-1-q is slack. From lemma 3, WIC-1-y becomes *1b t P . The firm is unwilling to 
pay a positive basic wage in period 1, *1 0w  . The results are summarized as follows:  
 
Lemma 4 
  The optimal remuneration package in period 1 is given by 
[1] in the case of w kft G , *1 [0 , ]w w kf G  and * *1 1w b w kf  P   G  
[2] in the case of w kf G , *1 0w   and *1b  P . 
 
Once the employment relationship has been established, the firm has to incur the firing 
cost when the worker quits (is fired by) the firm. Thus, the worker has an opportunity to 
receive the monetary transfer kf whenever he quits. The firm must compensate the 
worker with the transfer to keep the worker employed. The firm and the worker 
anticipate the situation after the relationship has been established; thus, in period 1, the 
firm is willing to take back the entire rent that the worker will receive in period 2 or 
later. The case [1] in lemma 4 means that in period 1 the firm can take all rents, which 
the worker will receive in period 2 or later, by lowering the remuneration in period 1. 
On the other hand, in case [2] in lemma 4, the firm can absorb a part of the rent. 
 The following result is easy to introduce from lemmas 3 and 4: 
 
Proposition 3 
[1] In the cooperative phase, the optimal basic wage in period 1 is lower, but in period 2 
or later it is higher than the outside wage: *1 *w w w d . 
[2] An optimal bonus is equivalent to the effort cost in any period of the cooperative 
phase: *1 *b b  P . 
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Proposition 3 shows that the worker receives the rent through the basic wage in period 2 
or later, and that the firm takes back the entire or a part of the rent by lowering the basic 
wage in period 1. The gap in the basic wage between in periods 1 and 2 or later is given 
by kf  or (1 )kfG . Therefore, EPL increases the gap in the basic wage before and 
after establishing the relationship. 
 
2. Minimum discount factor for cooperation 
 The incentive compatibilities of the firm in period 1 are given by 
 
 FIC-1-p: * *1 11 (1 * *) 01
w b w bG     t G ,      
       
 FIC-1-b: * * *1 1 11 (1 * *) 1 min ,1 1
ww b w b w f kfG ­ ½     t  G ® ¾ G  G¯ ¿
. 
 
We have to deliberate whether the minimum discount factor G  for cooperation from 
period 2 satisfies FIC-1-p and FIC-1-b.  
 When *1 *b b  P  is offered, FIC-b holds if and only if FIC-1-b does. This 
means that FIC-1-b always holds as an equality under G  G  because FIC-b holds as an 
equality under G  G  from the definition of G . Thus, it is sufficient to consider 
whether the other constraint, FIC-1-p, holds under G  G . If it holds, the discount factor 
G  is also the minimum value for cooperation from period 1, which is denoted as *G .  
 
Lemma 5 
  It holds that *G  G  when 1 min ,
1
wf kf­ ½t G ® ¾ G¯ ¿
 does.  
 
The lemma indicates that the minimum discount factor G  for cooperation in period 2 
or later, which is specified in proposition 1, satisfies FIC-1-p and FIC-1-b when the 
above condition holds. Note that FIC-1-b always holds as an equality under G  G . 
When the condition in lemma 5 holds, the right-hand side of FIC-1-b is non-negative by 
offering *1w , appropriately. Thus, FIC-1-p holds under G  G .  
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 Since min ,
1
wf kf­ ½G ® ¾ G¯ ¿
 increases with respect to G , there is a value of 
ˆG  such that ˆ min , 1ˆ1
wf kf­ ½G   ® ¾ G¯ ¿
. Thus, the condition in lemma 5 is replaced as 
follows: 
 
 ˆG d G , where ˆG  satisfies ˆ min , 1ˆ1
wf kf­ ½G   ® ¾ G¯ ¿
.             …(10) 
 
 I present a sufficient condition, w kft G , under which condition (10) holds. As 
lemma 4 shows, when w kft G  holds, the firm can absorb all of the rent, which the 
worker will receive in period 2 or later, by lowering the basic wage sufficiently in 
period 1.6 The present value of the firm’s total profit is equivalent to the total net 
benefit generated by the employment relationship, 1
1
wP 
G , which is always positive 
for any discount factor given in the assumption of the model. Therefore, the minimum 
discount factor *G  for cooperation from period 1 is equivalent to the discount factor 
G  from period 2 or later. The effect of EPL shown in proposition 2 is also applied from 
period 1.7 
 Finally, I consider the case in which condition (10) does not hold under G  G .  
 
Proposition 4 
  When condition (10) does not hold, the minimum discount factor that sustains mutual 
cooperation from period 1 is given by 
 
 
2
3
( ) 4 (1 )
* ( , )
2
kf w kf w kf
k f
kf
    PG  G { ! G . 
                                                  
6 The condition (10) holds if w kft G  does; however, the opposite is not true. Even if the firm 
cannot absorb all of the worker’s rent, FIC-1-p may hold under G  G . 
7 In this model, the basic wage and bonus have been assumed to be non-negative. Without the 
assumption of limited liability, firms could take all benefits of workers by sufficiently negative wage 
offers; thus, the discount factor G  is applied from period 1: *G  G . 
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The Proof is in the Appendix. When condition (10) does not hold, the discount factor 
*G  for cooperation from period 1 is more than G . As the folk theorem shows, a 
sufficiently high discount factor that satisfies all incentive conditions from period 1 
always exists. This case is likely to occur when kf is huge.  
 Condition (10) indicates that when both k and f are sufficiently large, the 
discount factor G  does not satisfy the incentive compatibilities of the firm in period 1. 
When the fraction of monetary transfer, k, is small, the discount factor G  satisfies the 
incentive compatibilities of the firm in period 1 even if the firing cost f is huge. In fact, 
as lemma 4 shows, in the case of 0k  , the firm can take back all of the rent, which the 
worker receives in period 2 or later. Hence, the minimum discount factor *G  for 
cooperation from period 1 is equivalent to G . 
 
3. Effects of EPL 
 The effect of the firing cost is given as the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5 
[1] When condition (10) does not hold, it holds that 3* ( , )k fG  G . A hike of f or k 
increases *G . 
[2] Otherwise, *G  G  holds. The effect of the firing cost is given as shown in 
proposition 2.  
 
The Proof is in the Appendix. Finally, I consider the effect of the firing cost on the 
minimum value of the discount factor that sustains mutual cooperation from period 1. 
 
Proposition 6 
  As the firing cost increases given a particular level of the fraction of monetary 
transfer, the minimum value of the discount factor *G  that sustains mutual cooperation 
from the period 1 decreases first, then increases.  
 
The shape of the minimum discount factor *G  that sustains mutual cooperation from 
period 1 is dependent on the parameters, as shown in figures 3 and 4. Regardless of the 
cases shown in figure 3 or 4, as the firing cost increases, the minimum discount factor 
*G  decreases first, then increases. 
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 As the firing cost increases, the ex post rent of the employment relationship 
increases given a particular fraction k of the monetary transfer. Thus, it reduces the 
minimum discount factor for cooperation and makes the firm and the worker more 
motivated to cooperate. This is the positive effect of EPL to enhance cooperation. 
However, when the firing cost is huge, the monetary transfer that the worker can receive 
is large. Thus, the firm has to offer a big remuneration to keep the worker’s incentive, 
which discourages the firm from employing the worker. This is the negative effect, 
which is likely to appear when the fraction of the monetary transfer is high. The 
negative effect caused by strict EPL requires a higher discount factor for cooperation. 
Therefore, as shown in figures 3 and 4, there is an appropriate strictness in EPL in the 
middle range.  
 
 
6. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
 I have considered the effect of firing costs on the minimum discount factor for 
cooperation: [1] A hike in the firing cost first decreases the minimum discount factor, 
and then increases it and [2] A hike in the fraction of the monetary transfer increases the 
minimum discount factor. These results show that procedural inconveniences such as 
providing advance notices or negotiations with unions can enhance a cooperative 
employment relationship as long as they are not strict. In contrast, monetary transfers 
such as severance pay dampen cooperation because they discourage workers’ incentive.  
 The above results are explained intuitively as follows. The existence of 
procedural inconveniences increases the ex post rent generated by the relationship 
between a firm and a worker; thus, their motivation for cooperation is enhanced. As a 
result, the minimum discount factor for cooperation decreases. On the other hand, a hike 
in the firing cost increases the severance pay that workers receive when they leave their 
firms. This makes the moral hazard problem of workers more serious; thus, firms are 
required to pay high remuneration. The effect is negative. As the firing cost increases, 
the positive effect is likely to be dominated by the negative one; thus, an appropriate 
level for the firing cost exists in the middle range.  
 Although I have focused on an employment relationship from a microeconomic 
perspective, this result is associated with macroeconomic views. From the perspective 
of macro search models, the effect of EPL has been controversial. When EPL is strict, 
the effect of EPL is likely to be negative and to worsen unemployment rates. However, 
22 
 
when EPL is moderate, it is not always negative. A similar result is obtained from both 
macroeconomic and microeconomic perspectives.  
 In this paper, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under the trigger strategies 
has been considered. Although it has the virtue of being simple to analyze, the 
possibility of renegotiation is ignored. An optimal punishment scheme is also beyond 
the focus of this paper, but infinitely repeated punishment seems to be unrealistic. 
However, it is not essential to the results. Suppose that the punishment phase continues 
for a particular s ( 1t ) period. Even if they deviate from the cooperative phase, they can 
return from the punishment phase in s periods. As s increases, punishment is severe, and, 
thus, the minimum discount factor for cooperation decreases. As long as s is positive, 
that is, the punishment phase exists, the results in this paper hold. Clearly, when the 
punishment phase continues infinitely, the minimum discount factor for cooperation is 
minimized.8  
 The above situation, in which firms and workers can return to the cooperative 
phase from the punishment one, is also associated with the macroeconomic search 
model. In the Mortensen- and Pissarides-type search model, firms and workers can find 
new partners from the unemployment pool. Although I have not considered the 
macroeconomic search mechanism, the main result of this study is consistent with those 
of the macroeconomic perspectives and is not much influenced by the assumption of the 
trigger strategies. 
   
  
 
                                                  
8 This is the principle of Abreu (1988). 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of lemma 1 
  A firm and a worker play their trigger strategies in period t (t = 2, 3,…). 
[1] The best response of the worker to the firm in the punishment phase is as follows: 
x In subperiod t2, the worker will not produce positive output given the history of 
2 *
1( ) ( , *, ..., *, {( *, *) , 1})h t a a a w bz  because the worker realizes that he cannot 
receive any bonus, and that his payoff is not influenced hereafter by generating high 
output.  
x In subperiod t1, the worker will remain in the firm, qt = 1, if the basic wage offer is 
equivalent to or more than his alternative payoff, (1 )w kf G . He gets the 
monetary transfer kf in the incumbent period and the outside wage w  hereafter if 
he quits; thus, his average payoff in a period is given by (1 )w kf G . If the firm 
pays the basic wage or a higher wage, it is more optimal for the worker to remain 
than to quit. Otherwise, the worker will quit the firm, qt = 0.  
Therefore, the trigger strategy of the worker is the best response to the firm in the 
punishment phase. 
[2] The best response of the firm to the worker in the punishment phase is as follows: 
x In subperiod t3, zero bonus payment, bt = 0, is optimal for the firm given the history 
of 3 *1( ) ( , *, ..., *, {( *, *) , 1, 1})h t a a a w bz  because a positive bonus does not 
induce the worker to produce positive output hereafter.  
x In subperiod t0, given the history of 0 *1( ) ( , *, ..., *)h t a a az , the firm anticipates 
that no output is produced by the worker. In the case of 1( , )k fG t G , the zero 
remuneration package ( , ) (0, 0)t tw b   is optimal for the firm to induce the worker 
to quit. In the other case of 1( , )k fG  G , the firm will avoid breaking off the 
employment relationship; thus, the remuneration package 
( , ) ( (1 ) , 0)t tw b w kf  G  is optimal. The basic wage is the minimum payment to 
maintain the relationship. 
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Therefore, the trigger strategy of the firm is the best response to the worker in the 
punishment phase.  
 Accordingly, the outcome of a period t in the punishment phase is 
{(0, 0) , 0, 0, 0}ta   in the case of 1( , )k fG t G  or {( (1 ) , 0) , 1, 0, 0}ta w kf  G  
in the case of 1( , )k fG  G .ڦ 
 
 
Proof of lemma 2 
  FIC-b is written as follows: * (1 * *) min ,
1 1
wb w b f kfG ­ ½    t G ® ¾ G G¯ ¿
. Thus, 
it holds that  
 
 1 *(1 * *) min , min ,
1 1 1
w b ww b f kf f kf­ ½ ­ ½  t    t  ® ¾ ® ¾ G  G G G¯ ¿ ¯ ¿
. 
 
This indicates that FIC-p always holds as long as FIC-b does. ڦ  
 
 
Proof of proposition 1 
[1] In the case of 1( , )k fG t G , FIC-b becomes (1 * *) (1 )(1 *) (1 )w b w f  t G  G G . 
Substituting the remuneration package specified by lemma 3, it holds that  
 
 ^ `2( , ) (1 ) 1 (1 ) 0g k f k f w k f{ G   G    P d .          …(A1) 
 
Note that in the case of 1G  , it holds that ( , ) 1 0g k f w  P  .  
 In the case of 1k z  and 0f z , (A1) becomes a second-order inequality with 
respect to G . Then, I denote a smaller solution of ( , ) 0g k f   as 2 ( , )k fG : 
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^ `2
2
1 (1 ) 1 (1 ) 4(1 )
( , )
2(1 )
w k f w k f k f
k f
k f
         P
G {
 . 
 
Thus, when 2 ( , )k fG t G , the inequality (A1) holds as shown in figure A-1. The 
minimum value of the discount factor is given by 2 ( , )k fG  G . In addition, 2 ( , )k fG  
must satisfy 2 1( , ) ( , ) 1 (1 )
wk f k f
k f
G t G {   . The range is 0 (1 )(1 )
wf
k
 d  P . 
[2] Similarly, in the case of 1( , )k fG  G , FIC-b turns to 
(1 * *) (1 )(1 *) (1 )w b w kf w  t G  G G G . Substituting the remuneration package 
specified by lemma 3, it is obtained that G t P . Thus, the minimum value of the 
discount factor is given by G  P . In addition, it must satisfy 1( , )k fP  G . Thus, the 
range is 
(1 )(1 )
wf
k
!  P . 
[3] In the case of 1k   and 0f  , (A1) turns to 
1 w
PG t  . Thus, the minimum 
discount factor is given by 
1 w
PG   .ڦ 
 
 
Proof of proposition 2 
[1] In the case of 1( , )k fG t G , differentiating ( , )g k f  with the firing cost f: 
( , ) (1 )(1 ) 0g k f k
f
w  G  G  w . This means that the smaller solution of g(k, f) = 0 is 
reduced by a hike of f .  
 Next, differentiating ( , )g k f  with respect to k, ( , ) (1 ) 0g k f f
k
w  G  G !w . 
This indicates that the smaller solution of ( , ) 0g k f   is raised by an increase of the 
fraction of the monetary transfer. 
 [2] In the case of 1( , )k fG  G , the minimum discount factor G  is equivalent to P . 
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Thus, it is not affected by a hike of f or k. ڦ 
 
 
Proof of proposition 4 
 When the condition (10) does not hold, FIC-1-p does not hold under G  G . In 
this case, w kf G  holds. Thus, as lemma 4 shows, the optimal remuneration package 
in the period 1 is * *1 1( , ) (0 , )w b  P . Substituting the remuneration packages * *1 1( , )w b  
and (w*, b*) shown in lemma 3 into FIC-1-p, the following inequality is derived: 
 
 2( , ) ( ) 1 0h k f kf kf w{ G G   P t .                        …(A2) 
 
Under 1G  , (A2) becomes ( , ) 1 0h k f w P ! ; thus, (A2) holds. Then, I denote a 
larger solution of ( , ) 0h k f   as 3( , )k fG , where  
 
 
2
3
( ) 4 (1 )
( , )
2
kf w kf w kf
k f
kf
    PG { . 
 
Therefore, when 3( , )k fG t G , (A2) holds (figure A-2). The minimum discount factor 
for cooperation from period 1 is given by 3* ( , )k fG  G .ڦ 
 
 
Proof of proposition 5 
Differentiating ( , )h k f  with respect to f, ( , ) (1 ) 0h k f k
f
w  G  G w . This indicates 
that 3( , )k fG  increases with respect to f. Similarly, differentiating ( , )h k f  with 
respect to k, ( , ) (1 ) 0h k f f
k
w  G G w . Thus, 3
( , )k fG  increases with respect to k. ڦ 
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Figure 1 
Timing of behaviors
t2 : The worker produces 
output or not, {0, 1}ty  . 
 
 
t3 : The firm pays the basic 
wage, and makes a decision 
on the bonus payment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t + 10 : The firm offers a new 
remuneration package,  pt + 
1 = (wt + 1, bt + 1). 
        ࣭ 
    ࣭ 
    ࣭ 
t0 : The firm offers a remuneration package, pt = (wt , bt). 
 
t1 : The worker remains or quits, {0, 1}tq  . 
 
 the worker remains:            the worker quits: 
 
 
 
 
period t 
The employment 
relationship is broken off; 
hence, the firm bears the 
firing cost f in period t (= 2, 
3,...).  
 
In period t (= 2, 3,...), the 
firm and the worker get the 
payoffs íf and kf w , 
respectively. (Note that in 
period t = 1, the firm and the 
worker get the payoffs 0 and 
w , respectively.) 
 
From period t + 1, the firm 
and the worker get the 
payoffs 0 and w  forever, 
respectively. 
        ࣭ 
    ࣭ 
    ࣭ 
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Figure 2 
In a period t (= 2, 3,…), the red curve indicates the minimum discount factor for mutual 
cooperation under the trigger strategies of the firm and the worker. In the case of 
1( , )k fG  G , the worker remains as dead wood in the firm in the punishment phase. In 
the case of 1( , )k fG t G , the worker quits (is fired by) the firm in the punishment 
phase. 
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Figure 3 
A case of the minimum discount factor *G  for cooperation represented by the red bold 
curve 
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Figure 4 
Another case of the minimum discount factor *G  for cooperation represented by the 
red bold curve 
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Figure A-1 
The curve of g (k, f) 
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Figure A-2 
The curve of h (k, f) 
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